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Abstract  
  
This study analyses the effects on unemployment and the quality of employment of the 
Spanish labour market reform in 2001 for the most important age groups. The content of the 
reform was based on the implementation of two policies: (i) a new permanent contract with 
lower firing costs than the ordinary one, and (ii) the reduction of the payroll taxes paid by 
firms to foster creation/ conversion of/ into permanent contracts. This reform extended to 
further groups of workers similar measures adopted in a previous reform in 1997. Using a 
data base of unemployed workers in the region of Madrid from January 1997 up to September 
2003, and methods for non-experimental data, the results suggest that, regardless of gender, 
workers below 30 years are negatively affected by the reform, and workers above 55 years 
show positive but small effects. The influence of the reform for workers between 45 and 50 
years is negligible. As regards education, graduates are more sensitive to the reform than 
workers with a lower level of education (primary and secondary education). 
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1. INTRODUCTION: 
 
 
Governments spend great amounts of resources, basically from taxes, to develop 
social programmes and other public activities. The study of these profits and losses plays an 
important role on the public decision taking. For analytical and policy purposes, the OECD 
breaks down this spending into so-called active and passive programmes. The earlier set of 
measures comprises a wide range of policies aimed at improving the access of unemployed 
workers to the labour market and jobs, job-related skills and the functioning of the labour 
market, while the latter consist of income transfers. 
 
Considering the economic situation of each country and the commitments of the European 
Union Summit Meeting of Luxembourg in December 1997, European governments have 
introduced several labour market reforms in order to promote employment. The importance 
of these measures can be shown in Table 1. It presents the expenditures on the main 
categories of active labour market programmes for several EU countries in 2001. Although 
Spain dedicates a small amount of resources to these policies (compared to other EU 
countries), the category with the highest weight with respect to the GDP is the subsidised 
employment, which represents around 55% of the total active measures and a fifth of the 
labour market policies. This fact justifies the interest of an analysis of these measures. 
 
In this study, I assess the impact of the Spanish labour reform in 2001 on one of the most 
representative regions of Spain, Madrid, for the most significant age groups. The last 
reforms implemented in Spain have been done “at the margin”, that is, several distortions 
have been included and affect to specific groups of unemployed workers for last six years. 
These reforms are associated with the active labour market measures and are based on two 
main policies: a new permanent contract with lower dismissal costs than the ordinary one, 
and the promotion by reduction of payroll taxes paid by firms to foster creation / conversion 
of / into permanent contracts.  
 
This work constitutes a complement of previous papers about Spanish labour reforms in 
1984, 1994 and 1997, like Jimeno, Kugler and Hernanz (2002), Dolado et al. (2001), 
Ferreiro and Serrano (2001), and Segura (2001), and new studies of other active labour 
market policies, for example, Arellano (2003).  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides evidence about the 
institutional framework and evolution of contracts and unemployment in the region of 
Madrid and Spain and the institutional framework. The theoretical structure and 
methodology are observed in Section 3. Section 4 describes the sample used in this study 
and Section 5 presents the results. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 3
Au
st
ria
Be
lg
iu
m
De
nm
ar
k
Fi
nl
an
d
Fr
an
ce
G
er
m
an
y
G
re
ec
e
Ne
th
er
la
nd
s
Po
rtu
ga
l
Sp
ai
n
Sw
ed
en
U.
K.
1.
 P
ub
lic
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t s
er
vic
es
 a
nd
 a
dm
in
ist
ra
tio
n
0,
14
0,
17
0,
12
0,
12
0,
18
0,
23
0,
06
0,
26
0,
11
0,
09
0,
23
0,
13
2.
 L
ab
ou
r m
ar
ke
t t
ra
in
in
g
0,
20
0,
24
0,
85
0,
29
0,
25
0,
34
0,
21
0,
31
0,
15
0,
14
0,
30
0,
05
3.
 Y
ou
th
 m
ea
su
re
s
0,
03
-
0,
10
0,
16
0,
42
0,
09
0,
10
0,
04
0,
22
0,
06
0,
02
0,
15
4.
 S
ub
sid
ise
d 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
0,
11
0,
77
0,
17
0,
29
0,
37
0,
25
0,
08
0,
38
0,
09
0,
40
0,
24
0,
01
 -H
iri
ng
 s
ub
sid
ie
s
0,
06
0,
27
0,
02
0,
15
0,
18
0,
03
0,
05
0,
05
0,
01
0,
25
0,
19
0,
01
5.
 M
ea
su
re
s 
fo
r t
he
 d
isa
bl
ed
0,
06
0,
12
0,
33
0,
09
0,
09
0,
29
0,
01
0,
58
0,
04
0,
03
0,
31
0,
02
Ac
tiv
e 
m
ea
su
re
s 
(fr
om
 1
 to
 5
)
0,
53
1,
30
1,
56
0,
95
1,
31
1,
20
0,
46
1,
58
0,
61
0,
73
1,
09
0,
36
Pa
ss
ive
 m
ea
su
re
s 
(*)
1,
07
2,
18
3,
00
2,
02
1,
65
1,
92
0,
47
1,
86
0,
90
1,
33
1,
19
0,
56
La
bo
ur
 m
ar
ke
t p
ol
ici
es
1,
60
3,
48
4,
56
2,
96
2,
96
3,
13
0,
93
3,
44
1,
52
2,
06
2,
28
0,
92
La
bo
ur
 m
ar
ke
t p
ol
ici
es
 fo
r o
ne
 p
oi
nt
 o
f u
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t r
at
e
0,
44
0,
53
1,
06
0,
33
0,
34
0,
40
0,
12
1,
43
0,
37
0,
16
0,
45
0,
18
Ac
tiv
e 
po
lic
ie
s 
fo
r o
ne
 p
oi
nt
 o
f u
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t r
at
e
0,
15
0,
22
0,
36
0,
10
0,
15
0,
15
0,
06
0,
66
0,
15
0,
06
0,
21
0,
07
(*)
 It
 in
clu
de
s 
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t b
en
ef
its
 a
nd
 e
ar
ly 
re
tir
em
en
t p
en
sio
ns
 fo
r l
ab
ou
r m
ar
ke
t r
ea
so
ns
.
So
ur
ce
: O
EC
D,
 E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t p
er
sp
ec
tiv
es
, J
un
e 
20
02
 
                       
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ta
bl
e 
1:
 S
pe
nd
in
g 
on
 la
bo
ur
 m
ar
ke
t p
ro
gr
am
m
es
 in
 E
U
 c
ou
nt
rie
s, 
20
01
 
 4
 
 
2. EVOLUTION OF THE LABOUR MARKET IN MADRID AND SPAIN: 
 
 
In order to know the reality of the economies and the labour markets of Spain and the 
region of Madrid in the last years, I have incorporated information about the Spanish labour 
legislation since 1997 and the relevant variables since 19982. 
 
The 1997 Spanish labour market reform introduced two important measures to promote the 
permanent employment, a new permanent contract with lower dismissal costs and the 
reduction of payroll taxes paid by firms to promote the creation of new permanent contracts 
from unemployment or the conversion of temporary contracts into permanent ones. 
Consequently, the duality of the Spanish contract structure between permanent and 
temporary contracts incorporates a new element. Old permanent contracts are characterized 
by a severance payment of 20 days’ wages per year of job tenure (up to 12 months) in the 
case of fair dismissals, and 45 days’ wages per year of job tenure (up to 42 months) in the 
case of unfair dismissals. New permanent contracts present the same figures as old ones for 
fair dismissals, but they allow a reduction of 33 days’ wages per year of job tenure (up to 24 
months) in the case of unfair dismissals. 
 
With respect to the set of temporary contracts, their main types have been derived from an 
adaptation and improvement of the so-called Workers’ Statute (Ley del Estatuto de los 
Trabajadores) and the subsequent legislation: 
 
Table 2: Main types of temporary contracts 
 
Type of Contract Purpose Duration Applicable groups 
Fixed-term project work Realize certain works or services 
Completion of such 
works or services 
Seasonal and Casual 
Increase firms' production 
because of market 
incidental facts 
Maximum of 6 months 
in a year  
Internship Cover an absent post Worker's absence period
Temporary substitute 
worker 
Completing the working 
day of workers partially 
retired 
Worker's absence period
All 
Apprentice Promote young new workers  
Between 6 and 24 
months 
Until 4 years after completion of 
University degree or medium / 
high technical college, or workers 
between 16 and 21 years 
Promotion of employment 
Help to introduce disabled 
workers to the labour 
market 
Between 12 and 36 
months Disabled workers 
 
 
However, these instruments were applied to several groups of disadvantaged unemployed 
workers and the reductions varied among them. From this reform, the changes of legislation 
have consisted of movements of the reduction of the payroll taxes and the groups of 
unemployed workers, and the 2001 labour market reform constituted the most important 
                                                 
2 All this information about the labour market since this year is available in the web page of the Spanish 
Department of Employment (INEM): http://www.inem.es.  
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change of these measures since 1997. The differences for the most representative groups as 
well as more comments about the legislation are included in Appendix B. 
 
All these changes of legislation tried to improve the quality of employment, among other 
problems of the Spanish labour market. Figure 1 presents the evolution of new contracts and 
the conversions of temporary contracts into permanent ones, jointly with their respective 
aggregations in the region of Madrid and Spain between 1998 and 2003. It is necessary to 
note that this concept includes all temporary and permanent contracts. Figure 2 introduces 
the major types of contracts. 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of new contracts and conversions into permanent contracts 
 
Figure1a: New contracts, 1998-2003
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Figure 1c: Aggregation of new contracts, 1998-2003
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Figure 1b: Conversions into permanent contract, 1998-2003
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Figure 1d: Aggregation of conversions, 1998-2003
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Note: All these series are normalized by data of January 1998. The vertical lines indicate the date when the 
new labour market legislations were introduced between 1998 and 2003: December 1998, December 1999, 
March and December 2001, and December 2002, respectively 
    Source: INEM 
 
Apart from seasonal effects with reductions of new contracts in August and increases in 
October, there does not appear a clear pattern in the evolution of the new contracts after the 
reforms.  
 
Figure 1 can be divided in two periods. In the first time interval, between January 1998 and 
December 2001, the evolution of new contracts in Madrid is slightly better than in Spain. 
Therefore, the difference between both lines widens as it is illustrated in Figure 1c. The 
second period (January 2002-August 2003) is characterized by the similar behaviour 
between Madrid and Spain. With respect to the conversions of temporary contracts into 
permanent ones, the evolution is very similar in the first period, but there exists a slightly 
better performance in Spain during the second period. It is worth to consider the huge 
increases of the conversions since January 1999 and March 2001 that change the slope of the 
line of aggregated conversions clearly in Figure 1d. These two dates incorporate changes in 
labour market legislation. Moreover, there are seasonal effects both in the evolution of 
conversions into permanent contracts and new contracts. 
 
 6
The changes of legislation affect the behaviour of the most important types of permanent and 
temporary contracts (Figure 2). The division between these two periods in Figure 2 is not 
only justified by the change in the evolution of contracts, but also because a change in the 
contract typologies took place at the end of 2001 by INEM. 
 
The evolution of new permanent contracts does not show a different pattern until 2001 in 
Spain. However, differences in the behaviour of permanent contracts arise with respect to 
the remaining contracts one year earlier in Madrid. 
 
Other important characteristic is the old permanent contracts’ behaviour, which is better than 
the other contracts, especially as the GDP growth decreases since 2001. This fact is 
compatible with employers’ prudence if the worker does not belong to the groups affected 
by the reforms. 
 
Comparing Figures 1 and 2, a substitution effect can be inferred at least in the second labour 
market reform, because the increase of the conversions is compensated in part by the 
decrease of the initial new permanent contracts. A possible explanation is employers’ 
prudence, because they use temporary contracts as a screening device. 
 
In the second period (Figures 2c and 2d), there are not important distinctions among them, 
and the fluctuations are explained by the seasonal evolution of the Spanish economy3, 
although there exists also an exhaustion of new permanent contracts at the end of the period.  
 
However, this aggregation may prevent from observing other significant facts, especially 
when the legislation distinguished among different groups of workers (Appendix B). 
Therefore, gender and several age groups are also introduced to study the effects of the 
reforms more profusely4. 
 
With respect to the composition of the conversions, the two highest peaks of Figure 3a are 
associated to a different age group. The focus of the change of legislation on some specific 
group can be also derived. Unlike to the first important value in May 1999 with small 
differences among the age groups for men, the second maximum in May 2001 indicates the 
emphasis on the youngest workers. Moreover, the higher the age of the workers is, the less 
the fluctuations and the amount of the conversions are. Comparing for each age group, men 
seem to present a better behaviour than women, especially for men below 45 years. 
 
The most important difference between men and women corresponds to the group between 
30 and 44 years. This subset is not affected by the reforms in general. For the remaining 
groups, the differences are smaller because of a favourable behaviour of women compared to 
men.  
 
                                                 
3 I insist on the change of definitions as an important explanation of the behaviour among groups in these two 
periods. 
4 I only incorporate information of the composition of conversions in Spain because there are not important 
differences between the region of Madrid and Spain. 
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Figure 3: Evolution of conversions and permanent contracts by gender and age in Spain 
 
Figure 3a: Conversions by gender and age in Spain
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Figure 3b: New contracts by gender and age in Spain
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Note: The reference for these series is the number of conversions and new contracts obtained by 
men for each age group in January 1998. The vertical lines indicate the date when the new labour 
market legislations were introduced between 1998 and 2003: December 1998, December 1999, 
March and December 2001, and December 2002, respectively 
Source: INEM 
 
 
However, from Figure 3b, women below 30 years get more new contracts than men who 
belong to the same age group, although both sets show small dissimilarities. Comparing 
among age intervals, the differences among groups for women are higher than for men, but 
they reduce as time passes. While men’s behaviour is approximately constant, women 
improve during this period. A possible explanation of this fact would be the application of 
all these labour market measures. 
 
Only new and old permanent contracts (Figures 3c and 3d) are distinguished when age and 
gender are incorporated to the new contracts. Considering these two figures, the possible 
existence of effects derived from the reforms may be also observed, especially since March 
2001. 
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Figure 3c: Old and new permanent contracts for men in Spain
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Figure 3d: Old and new permanent contracts for women in Spain
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Note: These series take as point of reference the number of old permanent contracts for men with 
each age group in January 1998. The vertical lines indicate the date when the new labour market 
legislations were introduced between 1998 and 2003: December 1998, December 1999, March and 
December 2001, and December 2002, respectively 
Source: INEM 
 
As can be inferred from Figure 3c, the number of new permanent contracts is higher than old 
ones at least up to March 2001, except for men between 30 and 44 years, because this group 
is not included in the labour market reforms. There are small amounts of contracts because 
some individuals of this group belong to other very specific groups affected by these 
reforms5. 
 
March 2001 legislation introduces a novelty for men below 30 years, because this set of 
workers was not included in the labour market measures after this month. This restriction 
implies a substitution effect from new to old permanent contracts. Only for this age group, a 
revealing increase of old permanent contracts is produced since 2001, and its evolution is 
similar to the amount of new permanent contracts for workers between 45 and 54 years. For 
the rest of groups there is a slight increase in all the period, but it is not comparable.  
 
With respect to women (Figure 3d), the decrease of new permanent contracts for those 
below 30 years is smaller than for men because the former group is still included in the 
                                                 
5 There are further details about these groups and how they are affected by the changes of legislation in 
Appendix B. 
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labour market measures. An increase of new permanent contracts for women between 30 and 
44 years is produced since March 2001 because they were added to the labour market 
reform. In relative terms, the effect was important; the number of contracts was multiplied 
by six in the next month (April 2001), and by 18 in October 2002. 
 
Although the main goal of the reforms was the improvement of the employment quality, the 
unemployment can be positively affected by these reforms. In order to study this possibility, 
Figure 4 points out this behaviour distinguishing among age, gender and education. The 
evolution of workers above 54 years is worse than the rest of groups, and it is the unique 
group whose situation in 1998 is better than in 2003. The evolution was constant up to 2001; 
an increase of the number of individuals belonging to this group has been produced since 
this year. Female unemployment explains this fact, because the evolution of unemployed 
men is stable for all the period; in both cases this age group plays an increasing role in the 
male and female unemployment. This fact generates that the percentage of workers above 54 
years grows from 10% to 17% of the total unemployed workers. 
 
On the contrary, the youngest workers present the best results, because it reduces up to 2001 
and afterwards the number of young people maintains constant for women or it grows 
slightly for men. Hence, the percentage was reduced from 37% to 27%. 
 
The other two groups are intermediate cases of these previous ones. The workers between 45 
and 54 years behave more similar to the oldest group (with a percentage increasing from 
15% to 18%). The set of individuals between 30 and 44 years decreases up to 2001 but it 
increases slightly in the second period, so the percentage is quite constant around 37% (the 
percentage for men is near 32%, and for women around 41%). 
 
The behaviour of percentages is more cyclical in the case of men than women, and their 
evolutions are clearly associated with the growing importance of women in the labour 
market. Except for women between 30 and 44 years, there is a convergence of percentages 
for the rest of groups. A possible explanation to this fact is the existence of a long-run effect 
of the labour market reforms, because it seems that there are not clear and direct 
consequences from them whether seasonal and cyclical effects are eliminated. 
 
These percentages and figures are comparable in Madrid and Spain, but the higher the age of 
the group is, the worse the evolution of the groups from Madrid in comparison with Spain. 
Hence, Figures 4a and 4b do not indicate an important influence of the reforms on the 
reduction of unemployment, although the indirect effects can appear in the changes of the 
unemployment structure. 
 
Finally, the education is introduced to study whether the effect of the reforms on 
unemployment is different among several levels. The workers with primary education 
present a high value at the end of 1998. The numbers are extremely unusual in Madrid (from 
one to seven in December 1998, and then it goes down to 2.75 in September 2003), and high 
between July 1998 and October 2000 in Spain. This is motivated by the initial small number 
of people belonging to this level.  
 
With respect to the other groups, two subsets can be distinguished: University Education and 
medium level education (Secondary Education and Technical College –TC–). The 
differences between these two groups increase since July 1999 in favour of medium level 
education. The behaviour of workers with university degree is clearly negative since July 
2001 in Madrid, due to the reduced growth of its economy. However, in the case of Spain 
 11
there is a dichotomy between graduates (with a similar evolution to the case of Madrid) and 
the rest who behaves better and introduces a significant difference in 2003. 
 
The justifications to these movements are based on the educational structure of the new 
workers. The percentage of university degree unemployed workers is higher in Madrid than 
in Spain, but there is an unbalance between the requirements demanded by the firms and the 
education degree of workers. As in the case of age and gender, the combination of education 
and unemployment would not seem to show a significant influence of the reforms. Apart 
from seasonal characteristics of the Spanish economy, the relationship between 
unemployment and GDP is clear in the period of analysis, because unemployment finishes 
its downward slide in 2001, when the GDP begins to grow at a rate around 2-3%. 
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3. IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY AND ESTIMATION METHOD: 
 
 
The goal of this study is to identify the impact of the 2001 labour market reform on 
unemployment and the employment quality6. Given the great number of observations of the 
non-experimental data base and the different quantitative and qualitative measures, two 
different studies can be carried out: a general comparison between workers affected by the 
reform and the other set of workers, and partial comparisons among the most important 
groups7. 
 
The analysis of the effects of the labour market reform has a limited shelf life, because of the 
relatively high number of partial changes produced in the period of study. It is obvious that 
the conclusions from estimates will be derived from short-run results, due to the time limits 
given rise to the legislation. 
 
As a first approximation in the analysis of the data base, any person is able to occupy one of 
two mutually exclusive states at the same time, “1” denotes the treated state and “0” 
denotes the non-treated state. The potential outcome is defined by Y, so 1itY  is the outcome of 
individual i in period t whether this worker is affected by the labour market reform 
(treatment), and 0itY  in the case of non-treatment. The impact for individual i in period t of 
the policy is 01 itit YY − . However, this difference is unknown because it is not possible to 
observe these two terms for the same worker at the same time. This difficulty is called by the 
fundamental evaluation problem. In this section, this problem will be solved using an 
alternative and several assumptions that will allow to estimate the effect of the policy 
measures. 
 
In this case, the treatment group is defined as the set of those workers included in any of the 
groups affected by the labour reforms. The rest of workers are incorporated into the control 
group.  
 
The difference-in-difference (DID) estimation is one of the most appropriate methods for 
this sample, because one pre-programme set and one post-programme set of observations are 
available. The first assumption to use this process is the condition of equal behaviour of the 
outcome between the treatment and the control group if the policy is not produced. 
Therefore, it is necessary to control for some factors, e.g. unobserved individual effects and 
common macro effects8, which constitute a major obstacle to obtain fair estimates. 
  
The treatment effect on the treated is identifiable, but not the population impact, because the 
unobserved component of the treatment impact enters in the model as a temporary 
individual-specific effect that determines participation. Other problems which should be 
controlled in the DID estimation are related with the cyclical effects and the age-specific 
cyclical effects, as the figures of Section 2 illustrate. 
                                                 
6 For further references about the effect of the 1997 labour market reform, see Jimeno, Kugler and Hernanz 
(2002). 
7 If the results are similar having multiple control groups or at least there exists a consistency of them, there are 
good reasons to consider that the effect of the reform is estimated appropriately (Eissa and Leibman, 1996). 
8 According to Blundell and Costas-Dias (2000), the unobservable effect ittiitU µθφ ++= , where the first 
term of the sum is the individual-specific effect constant over time, the second is a common macroeconomic 
effect and the last term is the temporary individual-specific effect. 
 14
 
The possible existence of self-selection could be justified because these measures are not 
compulsory. Nevertheless, it does not mean an important difficulty in this case. The 
unemployed workers cannot change, at least easily, decisions in order to belong to the 
treatment or control group. This decision depends on the Spanish Government’s labour 
market policies and firms’ labour needs. Hence, there will be workers who satisfy the 
conditions established by the legislation but they do not belong to the treatment group, 
because the firms which hire them are not interested in these incentives. 
 
Associated with these problems, there is a possible substitution effect between workers of 
the treatment group and those who do not satisfy the conditions of the legislation to belong 
to a target group, although they have similar characteristics. With respect to the measures of 
the reforms, if they cover the differential of productivity between treated and non-treated 
workers, the substitution is not important. Firms might be also affected by this effect because 
they could have incentives to replace a worker finishing the economic advantages with a 
new “subsidized” worker. In spite of this fact, there are two reasons to abandon this 
possibility. First, the application period of the measures is large (at least two years) and 
usually exceeds the period of analysis. Second, the economic advantages are conditional on 
the use of permanent contracts. Therefore, the substitution costs are considerable compared 
to the profits of that decision. 
 
Finally, given that all these measures were introduced in the labour market immediately and 
the agents could not anticipate to the changes of legislation, the Ashenfelter’s dip does not 
constitute a severe problem. 
 
One possible source of identification is age. Unfortunately, there is an evident risk of having 
different cohorts in the treatment and control groups. This fact could generate different 
responsiveness to macroeconomic cycles, affecting the DID estimation. The assumption of 
independence between the selection into treatment and the temporary individual-specific 
effect would not be satisfied (both groups would not be subject to the same aggregate labour 
market trends). For this reason, the study of more specific groups is considered to eliminate 
this possibility. In conclusion, the fact that the programme is partly age-specific allows to 
use slightly older people of similar unemployment duration as a natural comparison group9. 
This question should be studied taking into account the possible different idiosyncratic gains 
from treatment for each age group that distortions the treatment effect (Blundell and Costas-
Dias, 2002). 
 
Other source of homogeneity comes from unemployed workers’ labour history. The 
evolution of the contracts registered in INEM between January 1997 and September 2003 is 
known. There does not exist any indicator to confirm the beginning of the worker’s labour 
history. A good option to overcome this problem of truncation is the use of contract’s 
renewals. When a contract finishes, it is possible to infer if the next contract is a renewal10. 
The conversion of a temporary contract into a permanent one is only a subset of all possible 
renewals. As Ham and Lalonde (1996) point out, the individual labour history from the 
second new contract will be analyzed in order to avoid distortions in the estimates. However 
                                                 
9 For further information about the evaluation problem, see Heckman et al. (1999) and Rubin (1974). 
10 The characterization of a renewal for temporary contracts depends on the economic activity of the new 
contract and firm’s localization. The value of the economic activity is associated to the National Classification 
of Occupations which is made up of eight digits. The localization depends on the municipality. Therefore, both 
variables are excellent indicators of the firm’s identification. A permanent contract can be perfectly classified 
as a renewal, because the variable which defines the type of contract incorporates a distinction between new 
permanent contract and conversion into permanent contract. 
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this measure implies an important restriction and elimination of observations (around 
450,000). A less restrictive alternative is the discrimination of the types of contracts 
depending on the maximum legal duration. In some cases, the unique possibility is the 
elimination (Fixed-term project worker, Internship and Temporary substitute worker). For 
the rest of contracts, a time restriction will be enough to know if the first contract can be 
accepted or not. 
 
With respect to the outcome variable, this study will pay special attention to the outflows 
into permanent employment. The absence of wages is not considered in this study as a major 
problem, because this variable is not included in the goal of these labour market reforms. 
Nevertheless, the type of contract is available. This variable is the most important reference 
to determine whether the reforms succeeded or not. The contracts will be divided into two 
great sets, permanent contracts and temporary contracts. The former group is also divided in 
two depending on they are renewals or not. The rigidity of the Spanish labour market 
reflected in the wages implies that the most of adjustments takes place through quantities 
rather than through prices. Therefore, the outcome variable is a dichotomous variable 
indicating if the worker gets a permanent or a temporary contract.  
 
The model used to implement the estimation strategy in this case is a probit model:  
 [ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]ttiERtiEtiRititiitit REdEdRdXddXe ××+×+×+++Φ== δδδγβα '',1Pr   (1) 
 
where 1=ite  if the individual i at time t is employed with a permanent contract and zero 
otherwise, id  is a vector of dummies for treated groups representing the treatment variable, 
tα  is a year effect, itX  includes covariates affecting individual i at time t, including quarter 
dummies and sector and seasonal variables. Specifications that control for age-specific 
cyclical effects include age group interactions with an expansion dummy tE  introducing the 
general economic effect; it is equal to 1 if the quarterly economic growth is higher than 3% 
and 0 otherwise11. tR  is a dummy for reform dates, so that δ , the vector of reform/treatment 
group interactions, captures the effects of interest. The age-specific cyclical effect is 
captured by Eδ , Rδ  quantifies the influence of the reform on the treatment groups, while 
ERδ  measures the reform impact relative to the expansion. 
 
A worker is assumed to occupy one of three mutually exclusive labour situations: a 
permanent job, a temporary job and unemployment. The transitions from unemployment / 
temporary employment to permanent employment will be also analyzed separately. Given 
the importance of conversions of temporary contracts into permanent ones, two subsets will 
be created when transitions come from temporary contracts. The selection rule will be the 
condition of the permanent contract as a renewal of the previous temporary contract or not12.  
 
In order to estimate the reform’s effects correctly, it is necessary to identify a suitable 
comparison group. Considering the data base, women between 30 and 44 years will be used 
as a natural control group to compare with women below 30 years and above 45 years. It 
would not be correct to use men between 30 and 44 years, because middle-aged men have 
different labour conditions to women of the same age group. Using a similar argument, men 
                                                 
11 A continuous economic growth was produced between 1997 and 2003. The possibility to distinguish among 
terms from the general economic point of view is the separation between high and low economic growths, 
establishing the limit in 3%.  
12 It is possible to make this distinction thanks to the elimination of observations done because of truncation. 
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between 30 and 44 years constitute a control group for men below 30 years and above 45 
years. This selection is one of the reasons to explain the application of these reforms to 
specific groups (Table 3). 
 
Given the large number of observations, these age groups will be reduced in order to balance 
the difference between groups with similar behaviour and characteristics13. Workers between 
25 and 30 years will be compared with those between 31 and 35 years, and workers between 
40 and 44 years with other people between 45 and 50 years. 
 
Finally, no treatment group may be comparable with other one, because the measure for each 
group is quantitatively different. A possible alternative involves conditioning on the 
observable characteristics, assuming that the differences among groups are only limited to 
the measure (lack of unobserved heterogeneity).  
 
 
Table 3: The measures for the treatment and control groups 
 
  Before the 2001 reform The 2001 reform 
  
Reduction payroll 
taxes (%) 
New permanent 
contract 
Reduction payroll 
taxes (%) 
New permanent 
contract 
Workers < 30 years 20 YES 0 YES 
Workers ∈ [ 30, 45) 
years 0 NO 0 NO 
50 (1st year)  50 (1st year)  Workers ∈ [ 45, 55) 
years 45 (thereafter) 
YES 
45 (2nd year) 
YES 
51 (1st year)  55 (1st year)  
M
E
N
 
Workers ≥ 55 years 
45 (thereafter) 
YES 
50 (2nd year) 
YES 
Workers < 30 years 20 YES 25 YES 
Workers ∈ [ 30, 45) 
years 0 NO 25 NO 
50 (1st year)  50 (1st year)  Workers ∈ [ 45, 55) 
years 45 (thereafter) 
YES 
45 (2nd year) 
YES 
51 (1st year)  55 (1st year)  
W
O
M
EN
 
Workers ≥ 55 years 
45 (thereafter) 
YES 
50 (2nd year) 
YES 
 
                                                 
13 These limitations manage to satisfy the assumption of common aggregate labour market trends for treatment 
and control groups.  
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4. DESCRIPTION OF THE SAMPLE: 
 
 
The data bases used in this study were provided by INEM. On one hand, the first data 
set includes all the workers with active labour demand at the end of several months in the 
region of Madrid. Any individual who appears in these files presents multiple personal 
characteristics, resumed in Appendix A. On the other hand, those contracts generated in the 
region of Madrid between January 2000 and December 2001 are also available14. All the 
information about how the workers are affected by the laws is also presented in this data 
base.  
 
Several reasons can justify the use of all the population of contracts generated in Madrid 
versus a random sample of Spain. Madrid is a centripetal region in terms of (net) jobs, 
because it is one of the most dynamical and richest regions of Spain, so there are not high 
external effects from other regions that affect contracts. Moreover, this region is 
representative of the Spanish economy, and it is one of the regions which generate an 
important part of the total employment and GDP (around 17% in 2001). In terms of new 
contracts, the participation of Madrid in the total number varies around 9% and 16%. This 
percentage increases in the case of conversions into permanent contracts to the range 13% - 
22%. 
 
Finally, all the groups included in the labour market reforms may be studied. This option is 
not possible if a random sample for Spain is considered, unless the sample is very large. 
However, as was commented in the previous section, it is necessary to introduce a major 
degree of homogeneity in the sample. Some groups are not included in the final sample: 
 
• Migrants. 
• Disabled people. 
• Workers in very difficult economic and social situation. 
• Any worker who is not unemployed. The purpose of getting a job is known, so any 
individual with active labour demand who desires a second employment or prefers to 
change his job is eliminated from the sample15. 
• Workers above 65 years.  
 
 
The final sample used in this study includes 1,797,555 contracts for 430,981 Spanish 
workers (not only people from Madrid, but also from other regions). With respect to the 
variables, the tables of Appendix C present descriptive statistics when the workers appear 
the first time in the sample. As may be deduced from the comments of Section 2, the tables 
divide men from women. Four age groups are also considered due to the arguments of 
Section 3. 
 
Considering the entire sample (Table C1), there are some important differences among the 
age groups. Education level is negatively related to age. The percentage of workers with 
Primary and Secondary Education is smaller for the older group than for the younger group. 
                                                 
14 These time intervals were imposed by the author because of legislation (see Figure B1 in Appendix B), 
because the data base has information about contracts from January 1997 to September 2003. 
15 Any worker who belongs to the treatment group must be unemployed, but the rest of workers could be non-
unemployed (workers with more than one job or workers seeking a better job). In order to homogenize the 
sample, all these workers are eliminated. 
 18
The small weight of the older workers is compensated by the increase of their percentage in 
the lowest education levels. The previous conclusion can also be extended to any kind of 
knowledge, because there is an inverse relationship between the percentage of workers who 
know English and age. 
 
Data show the correlation between the civil status and the age groups. The predominance of 
single status over marriage diminishes when the youngest workers are compared to the 
oldest ones. 
 
The effect of age on the probability to get any kind of benefit is perfectly justified, given the 
relationship between the right to get benefits and the number of years the individual works. 
Partially related to benefits, there exists a positive influence of age on the number of months 
with active labour demand. 
 
The differences among the age groups about the economic activity of the last job are studied 
are influenced by previous variables. Older workers’ last job is usually related to 
Construction and Hotel/Catering business. The weight of younger people without previous 
job is higher, and they prefer to get jobs associated with the Service Sector. 
 
These comments confirm the need for estimating several models to each age group in order 
to obtain appropriate results. The choice of the control group depends basically on the 
similarities to the corresponding treatment group, so the age differences between each group 
will be as small as possible. 
 
Regarding to the distinction between men and women (Tables C2 and C3), the education 
level of younger men is usually low compared to younger women. This relationship is the 
opposite for older groups. Something similar occurs when idioms are considered. The weight 
of younger men who do not know other idiom is higher than the corresponding female case. 
But these latter differences become insignificant when age increases. 
 
With respect to civil status, the most important differences appear in the interval between 30 
and 44 years, indicating that men marry later in life than women. However, the percentage of 
men who do not marry is smaller than in the case of women for older workers. 
 
There are not important differences in terms of benefits for the youngest workers, the 
percentage of women who do not receive any benefit decreases slower and it is maintained 
around 50% as age raises, while the percentage for men is around 30%. This result can be 
justified by the higher participation of older men in the labour market. This explanation and 
the difficulty in getting a job, as can be observed in the number of months of active labour 
demand, can argue the focus of the labour market reforms on women. 
 
The economic activity selected as first option to get a job presents also important 
peculiarities. The most popular options for women are jobs related to Non-skilled Workers16, 
Restaurant Workers, Protection and Sellers, and White-collar Workers. Men prefer jobs 
related to Construction and Industry. The previous difference is connected to the labour 
history of each group. Finally, the percentage of women getting a permanent contract as first 
job is slightly higher than men only for the younger groups. This fact can constitute a 
consequence of the labour market measures. 
 
                                                 
16 The exception is the group of youngest workers. This result can be associated to the low education level of 
men, which increases the possibility to choose this option. 
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5. RESULTS OF THE IMPACT OF THE 2001 LABOUR MARKET REFORM: 
 
 
Using equation (1), a model is estimated for men and women because of the 
differences between them. Probit marginal effects of the most important variables appear in 
tables of Appendix D. The conclusions have to be considered taking into account that the 
legislation previous to the 2001 labour market reform was not the 1997 reform but a 
modification incorporated in the 1999 State Budget Law (Appendix B). 
  
The definition of each group depends on the use of the full sample or a restrictive version. In 
the first case, the treatment group is constituted by unemployed workers below 30 years, 
between 45 and 54, and between 55 and 65 years. The control group are those unemployed 
workers between 30 and 45 years. Because these groups show significant variety in some 
characteristics (Section 4), restricted age groups are applied. Three different set of workers 
can be analyzed: workers between 25 and 35 years where the age limit is 30 years, and 
workers between 40 and 44 years will be compared to two other groups, between 45 and 50 
years and between 55 and 60 years. 
 
Other piece of advice from the previous sections is the complexity to obtain general common 
results. Apart from the dissimilarities among age groups, the results depend crucially on the 
differences of measures between each treatment and control group, before and after the 
reform (Table 3). For each gender, the estimates can be compared among transitions for the 
same treatment and control groups, and between the two oldest groups, because they share 
the same control group. With respect to women, the conclusions are more complicated. The 
control groups also suffer changes, so the comments have to focus on the net effects of the 
measures. 
 
The control variables used to estimate the marginal effects in the models are defined in 
Appendix A. An additional distinction among education levels is introduced to analyze the 
possible dissimilarities in the labour measures’ effects. In order to avoid a great amount of 
estimates for each level, the three most representative education levels were selected. 
Comparing them, there are not important differences in estimates’ signs and their 
corresponding tests. The estimates are usually similar between Primary and Secondary 
Education and lower in absolute value than University Education’s estimates. 
 
When the origin of the transition to a permanent contract is not distinguished, the marginal 
effect captures the change in the permanent employment probability of the treatment group 
with respect to the control group. The estimates show statistically significant effects, and 
higher for men between 45 and 54 years than for the other treatment groups. The permanent 
employment probability increases at least by 0.0616 for the former group, by more than 
0.0403 for the youngest group and 0.386 for the oldest one. In the case of women, the 
estimates present greater values between the target groups and the comparison group. 
 
As Table D1 shows, any of the estimates derived from the product of the treatment, the 
reform and the expansion dummy variables is negative and highly significant for men above 
45 years. The reform can be understood as an instrument to reduce the fluctuations of the 
permanent employment supply for older men. The number of new permanent contracts is 
positively correlated with a high economic growth, as the estimates of the target groups and 
the expansion dummy variable present. In these economic situations, the decision to generate 
a permanent contract to these workers depends on sector and firm’s conditions. When the 
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economic growth is small, there is a high uncertainty about the economic future. New factors 
play an increasing role to create new permanent employment, e.g. marginal changes in 
labour market legislation.  
 
The effect is usually positive and significant whether the workers below 30 years are studied 
for the entire sample. But the effect is small and losses its importance if the sample is limited 
to the restricted age groups. In this case, the reform could stimulate the creation of 
permanent contracts for younger workers to avoid the abuse of temporary contracts. Firms 
would try to increase the labour supply partly with temporary contracts in expansions as a 
precaution against future depressions. This non-linear effect is not very important for 
women. Those estimates which are slightly significant confirm the countercyclical effect of 
the reform for the treatment groups. 
 
Although the youngest men can get a permanent contract earlier than the medium-aged 
workers, the reform does not help this age group. Fortunately, this effect is compensated by 
the economic expansion’s influence on this group. This result is consistent with the new 
measures affecting to this group. This reform eliminates the reduction of the payroll taxes 
paid by firms, although they still belong to those workers who can be hired using the new 
permanent contract (Table 3). Given that the control group does not suffer any change of 
legislation, the expected effect of these measures on the treatment group coincides with the 
estimates. 
 
This previous conclusion is very similar to young women, because the reform also presents 
negative estimates for this age group. Nevertheless, these groups are affected in a different 
way by the reform. The measures are common in terms of percentages for the treatment and 
control groups, although only women below 30 years can get the new permanent contract 
(Table 3). The expected effect is also negative and the reform generates a similar influence 
for the two groups below 30 years, but the measures are different. 
 
The belonging to the older age groups generates slightly better results. The influence of the 
reform is not very significant and the expansion achieves further beneficial effects. This 
latter estimate is compensated by the value obtained from the combination of expansion, 
reform and treatment dummy variables. Hence, the older groups suffer negligible changes of 
their conditions in this reform. 
 
The change of the measures for older women is identical to men for the treatment groups; 
but the control group is included in the reform. Firms can get a reduction of payroll taxes 
similar to the youngest women if they are hired using a permanent contract. In spite of this 
fact, the net effects of older women are similar to men. The combination of the reform, 
expansion and treatment generates negative and not very significant estimates. The positive 
influence of the expansion is smaller and the effect of the reform is slightly negative. 
 
Focusing on the results from the restricted age groups, the qualitative conclusions are alike 
to the final sample, although the effects are usually smaller. However, workers above 55 
years show higher estimates than those between 45 and 50 years, which is expected given 
the measures of those groups (Table 3).  
 
All these results may infer the small effectiveness of the reform and the usefulness of 
distinguishing among different sub-samples. A complementary explanation to these 
estimates is the low differences of productivity between these treatment and control groups 
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which are not compensated by incentives to firms. The reform would not constitute a good 
instrument to select unemployed workers belonging to the treatment groups. 
 
 
 
 
 
Transitions to permanent employment: 
 
 After estimating the transition from any labour situation to permanent employment, it 
is convenient to distinguish between two initial situations, unemployment and temporary 
employment. The transition from temporary to permanent employment includes an especial 
case, when the permanent contract constitutes a renewal of the previous temporary contract. 
This situation will be also analysed dividing this latter transition into conversions and non-
conversions. 
 
Table D2 reports probit marginal effects for transitions from unemployment to permanent 
employment. In this case, the dependent variable only takes value 1 if the transition comes 
from unemployment to permanent employment. The variables used in the models are the 
same as in the previous subsection. Although the signs of the significant estimates are 
identical to Table D1, these values are lower in absolute value. This result indicates the 
small influence of the reform and the economic expansion on this transition in comparison 
with the general case. The net effect of the significant variables is better for men, regardless 
of the sample used. Only the product of treatment, expansion and reform generates worse 
estimates for men than for women. 
 
When the restricted age groups are introduced in the model, the effects for men above 55 
years are more important than men between 45 and 50 years, which confirm the expected 
results from the measures. This conclusion is also common to the older women. The 
estimates are higher in absolute value for the former group, although the influence of the 
reform is insignificant. Regarding to younger workers, this group is more probable to get a 
permanent contract earlier than their control group. The economic expansion also helps their 
incorporation to the labour market, but the effect of the reform is negative. 
 
With respect to the conversions of temporary contracts into permanent ones (Table D3), the 
results for the final sample are worse to previous ones, especially for women. The effects of 
the variables are not significant at most for any of the age groups. Only the dummy variables 
for age intervals are significant and positive except for men between 45 and 54 years. Only 
men between 45 and 54 years obtain good results, but this estimate is compensated by the 
negative figure of the interaction of the expansion with the reform dummy variable. 
 
For the restricted age groups, the effect of the reform for men above 45 years is negative in 
economic expansions. This influence intensifies as age increases. Nevertheless, it is 
compensated by the positive and significant effect of the expansion dummy. When the 
youngest workers are compared, the effect of the reform is negligible, but the economic 
expansion does not generate good effects on them. 
 
In the case of women, estimates confirm the negative outcome of the reform and the 
expansion on the youngest group, and the small efficacy on the older groups, more important 
for women above 55 years. 
 
 22
Finally, the effect of the 2001 labour market reform on the transitions from temporary 
employment to permanent employment excluding conversions is presented in Table D4. 
Unlike the previous transition, there are more significant effects of the variables for men and 
women. In general, the estimates show similar qualitative results when the final sample is 
used, although the estimates are smaller. Iin the case of women, they are slightly worse. 
 
With the restricted age groups, the qualitative conclusions are common to men and women, 
although the latter group shows positive and significant estimates for the age groups’ 
dummy variables. Workers below 30 years obtain negative estimates from the reform. They 
are compensated by the expansion dummy variable and the combination of this latter 
variable with the reform dummy variable. Older groups suffer a bad influence from the 
expansion, and the reform is ineffective for them. Distinguishing between them, workers 
above 55 years show higher results in absolute value than workers between 45 and 50 years, 
as occurred in other transitions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS: 
 
 
This study analyses the effect of the Spanish labour market reform in 2001 using a 
sample of unemployed workers in the region of Madrid. Apart from the theoretical 
importance of permanent employment in firms’ productivity and innovation, these labour 
market reforms try to generate positive effects on workers who have important difficulties to 
get a permanent contract. The reform’s measures are concentrated on the reduction of 
payroll taxes paid by firms and a permanent contract with lower firing costs. This reform, 
which can be classified as “carrot” of job assistant, is called “at the margin” because their 
measures are available only for some specific groups.  
 
The initial figures suggest that the effects of the labour market reform are concentrated on 
the composition of employment, not on the reduction of unemployment. The results from the 
DID estimator confirm partly this idea when the transition from temporary to permanent 
employment excluding conversions are studied. Firms may prefer to generate new 
permanent contracts instead of transforming temporary contracts into permanent ones if 
there is a clear economic expansion. The estimates suggest nevertheless that the reform does 
not constitute a powerful instrument to change temporary contracts into permanent contracts. 
 
In terms of policy implications and considering the goal of the reform to reduce the 
disadvantages of women with respect to men, it is very difficult to derive an evident 
conclusion about this topic. The results indicate that there are not dissimilarities in the 
effects between men and women. 
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The 2001 reform does not imply important changes compared to the previous situation as the 
last labour market reform meant in 1997. The estimates of workers above 55 years are 
consistent, because they are usually positive and small.  
 
With respect to men, workers between 45 and 54 years belong to the treatment groups but 
they do not suffer any change in their measures in comparison to the 1999 State Budget 
Law. Their corresponding control group is not included in the reform. Therefore, the 
expected effect is negligible17. The results confirm this idea and the assumptions made on 
the comparability on these groups are valid. 
 
Workers below 30 years are more sensitive to the reforms due to the more important and 
significant estimates. The effect of the reform on these groups is negative, regardless of the 
gender and in spite of the dissimilar measures between men and women for treatment and 
control groups. 
 
In general, these estimates are not in conflict with the figures of Section 2, because the 
measures between specific treatment and control groups are analyzed in these models.The 
figures show general age groups, without any other distinction. 
 
With respect to education, graduate workers show a higher sensibility to the reform than 
those less educated workers. In consequence, it would be interesting to introduce differences 
among education levels depending on the policy objectives. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 There exists a difference in terms of duration, which is common to this treatment group and the oldest one, as 
can be observed when Table B4 is compared to Table B5. However, the time interval between the beginning of 
the reform and the next change in legislation is smaller than two years, as occurred in previous reforms, so the 
influence of this topic on the estimates is supposed to be inappreciable. 
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Appendix A: Variable descriptions. 
  
 
In order to distinguish between original variables and transformed ones, we used the 
letter X. For example, levestu is an original variable that takes values between 0 and 9, and 
levestuX is a transformed dummy variable that takes value one if levestu = X and cero 
otherwise. 
   
1. woman is a dummy variable equals 1 if the worker is female. 
 
2. age is a variable which takes values from 18 to 65 years old. 
 
3. levestuX is a group of dummy variables that adopts value one if the level of 
studies of the individual is X , where X may be: 
  
0 → No education 
1 → Pre-Primary education without certificate 
2 → Pre-Primary education with certificate 
3 → Basic Technical College 
4 → Primary education 
5 → Medium Technical College 
6 → Secondary education 
7 → Superior Technical College 
8 → Graduate (3 years) 
9 → Graduate (more than 3 years) 
 
4. benefitX is a set of dummy variables indicating if an individual has some benefit. 
X indicates which kind of benefit may be: 
 
   0 → the individual does not receive any help 
1 → the individual receives benefits 
2 → the individual receives any subsidy except for worker above 52 years or 
related to Agriculture 
3 → the individual receives a subsidy for worker above 52 years 
4 → the help has been disappeared by any reason 
  
5. madrid is a dummy variable indicating if the worker’s residence belongs to this 
region. 
 
6. groupX is a set of dummy variables considering different economic activities in 
which people desire to work as their first preference. These variables follow the 
ten Big Groups of the National Classification of Occupations (CNO-94): 
 
0 → Armed Forces 
1 → Management and Public Administrations 
2 → Technicians, professionals, scientists and intellectuals 
3 → Support technicians and professionals 
4 → White-collar workers 
5 → Restaurant workers, protection and sellers 
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6 → Skilled workers in farming and fishing 
7 → Workers in factory industry, construction and mining 
8 → Operators of installations and machinery, and assemblers 
9 → Non-skilled workers 
 
7. dmonth defines the number of months that a worker has maintained the active 
labour demand continuously. 
 
8. Some dummy variables related to civil status are introduced: single, married, 
widowed, divorced. 
 
9. There are dummy variables indicating whether the worker knows other 
languages: English, French, German, Catalan, Galician, Basque, Valencian and 
other European (European) and non-European (othlan) languages. 
 
10. There are several dummy variables which denote the economic activity of the 
previous job if it existed: 
 
Agrfish   → Agriculture and Fishing 
Indust     → Industry and Energy 
Constr    → Construction 
Commer → Commerce 
Cater      → Hotel and Catering Business 
Transp    → Transports 
Finan      → Finance Services 
Estate     → Estate Activities 
Pubadm  → Public Administration 
Educat    → Education 
Health    → Health 
Othser    → Other Activities 
 
 
11. Finally, there are dummy variables for each year, month, day of the week and the 
first day of the month, due to the evolution of contracts. 
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Appendix B: Spanish Legislation affecting the sample  
 
 
The labour legislation presents two basic structures: Royal Decrees and Laws. The 
Royal Decree (RD) is incorporated to the Legislation by the Government immediately. It is 
necessary to be approved by the Parliament and transformed into a Law in any case. This 
process was thought to introduce important and urgent measures, to avoid behaviour 
distortions while the Parliament approved the corresponding Law. Unfortunately, it is 
frequently used when a party constitutes absolute majority in the Parliament. The reference 
of these instruments is divided into two numbers. The second one indicates the year of 
creation, and the first one indicates the order of generation among the other RDs and Laws 
in the corresponding year. 
 
Figure B1 shows the recent evolution of the legislation, distinguishing among measures 
which constitute a labour reform, partial changes of the initial reforms and other initiatives. 
 
 
Figure B1: Evolution of the Spanish Legislation between 1997 and 2003 
 
END OF THE PERIOD
30/9/2003
BEGINNING OF THE PERIOD 
1/1/1997
Law 63/1997
26/12/1997
Law 64/1997
26/12/1997
1997 Labour 
Reform
16/5/1997
Law 50/1998
30/12/1998
Law 55/1999
29/12/1999
RD 1451/1983
11/5/1983
RD 1368/1985
17/7/1985
Law 42/1994
30/12/1994
1984 Labour 
Reform
31/10/1984
Law 22/1992
30/7/1992
Law 39/1999
5/11/1999
RD 11/1998
4/9/1998
RD 5/2001
2/3/2001
Law 12/2001
9/7/2001
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Law 24/2001
27/12/2001
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30/12/2002
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2001 Labour 
Reform
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1994 Labour 
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19/5/1994
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LAWS
CHANGES OF THE REFORMS AT THE MARGIN
MEASURES FOR 
UNEMPLOYMENT
MEASURES FOR 
FAMILIES
INITIAL LABOUR MARKET REFORM LAWS  
 
The first important measure adopted was RD 1451/1983, which establishes labour measures 
for disabled workers. The firms which hire a disabled worker with a permanent contract 
received 3906.58 € and a reduction of payroll taxes paid by firms of 70 % if the worker was 
below 45 years, otherwise the percentage was 90 %. The upper limit of amount of money 
received was the 60 % of annual salary cost.  
 
Complementary to this measure, RD 1368/1985 introduced the legislation for disabled 
people who worked at Special Employment Centres (“Centros Especiales de Empleo”). Only 
people with a disability degree above 33% could work at these centres, and the economic 
help was the same as in the previous RD. 
 
After the implementation of the 1994 labour market reform (Law 10/1994), Law 42/1994 
included modifications of the legislation for permanent and temporary disability, and 
maternity. It also allowed part-time contracts as well as temporary contracts for some 
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unfavourable groups: long-run unemployed workers18, people above 45 years and disabled 
workers. The reduction of the payroll taxes paid by firms for a maximum period of three 
years depends on the number of workers of the firm, as Table B1 shows. 
 
SEE TABLE B1 
 
If these temporary contracts were transformed into permanents ones, then the firm would 
receive incentives (money and reduction of the payroll taxes for all the duration of the 
contract), according to Law 22/1992: 
 
SEE TABLE B2 
 
Law 63/1997 and Law 64/1997 contain the Spanish labour reform in 1997 in order to 
improve the labour market and incentive permanent contracts for specific groups of 
unemployed workers. The first Law introduced changes in Workers’ Statute, like a new 
work-experience contract dedicated to workers with university degree or a high Technical 
College degree and a new regulation for other temporary contracts. But the two most 
important actuations were: 
 
1. Incentives to hire some groups of unemployed workers using permanent contracts. 
2. Introduction of a new permanent contract with smaller dismissal costs for several 
groups of unemployed workers. 
 
Table B3 presents a resume of these two laws. 
 
SEE TABLE B3 
 
RD 11/1998 eliminated payroll taxes of firms if they hired unemployed workers to substitute 
those in periods of maternity or adoption. Law 39/1999 promoted the conciliation between 
family and job for workers. 
 
Other legislation in the State Budget Laws up to 2001 was created to complement and 
modify this labour market reform. Law 50/1998 and Law 55/1999 incorporated changes in 
the percentages. Table B4 describes the differences: 
 
SEE TABLE B4 
 
Afterwards, RD 5/2001 incorporated other labour reform in March 2001. It was approved by 
the Spanish Parliament 9th July 2001 (Law 12/2001). This law introduced higher payroll 
taxes for firms using temporary contracts with duration below 7 days, in order to avoid the 
abuse of this type of contracts. All the most important information about these laws as well 
as comparison between last two reforms appear in Tables B5 and B6. 
 
SEE TABLE B5 AND TABLE B6 
 
 
Finally, this last labour market reform was maintained in 2002 by Law 24/2001 and suffered 
changes in 2003 by Law 53/2002. This last law incorporated a new measure for firms with 
                                                 
18 Long-run unemployed workers are understood as people who were not hired at least in the last 12 months. In 
the case of medium-run unemployed workers, the minimum period is 6 months, and 3 months for short-run 
unemployed workers. 
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workers above 60 years who have more than 5 years of seniority in the firm. The payroll 
taxes of firms were reduced by 50% if 2003 is the first year satisfying this condition. The 
percentage increased by ten percentage points for each previous year satisfying the condition 
up to a maximum of 100%.  
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Table B1: Percentages of reduction of costs for firms 
 
Reduction (%)   Number of workers of the firm 
Groups 0 ≤ 25 > 25 
- Unemployed > 45 years 
 
100 
 
 75 
 
75 
 
- Disabled people 
 
100 
 
 75 
 
75 
 
- Long-run unemployed < 45 years 75  50 - 
 
 
Table B2: Groups and incentives of Law 22/1992 
 
Groups Money (€) Reduction (%) 
- Long-run unemployed workers > 45 years 
 
3005,06 
 
50 
 
- Long-run unemployed workers < 25 years 
 
2404,05 
 
- 
 
- Short-run unemployed workers ≥ 25 & ≤ 29 years 
 
2404,05 
 
- 
 
- Long-run women in jobs with small weight of female employment
 
3005,06 
 
- 
 
- Women > 25 years reincorporated to labour market after 5 years 
of inactivity 
  
3005,06 
 
- 
 
- Transformation of work-experience contracts into permanent 
ones  3305,57 - 
 
 
Table B3: Incentives and groups affected by the 1997 labour market reform 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 The maximum period that these measures can be applied for is 24 months, except for unemployed workers 
above 45 years (the period depends on the duration of the contract for this age group). 
20 These percentages were increased five points if a self-employed worker hired a worker who belongs to any 
of these groups. 
21 This group was affected by first two laws commented previously.  
Groups Reduction (%)19,20 New permanent contract
- Unemployed workers < 30 years 
 
40 yes 
- Long-run unemployed workers 
 
40 yes 
- Long-run unemployed women in jobs with a 
small weight of female employment 
 
60 no 
- Unemployed workers > 45 years 60 (2 first years)  
50 (thereafter) 
yes 
- Transformation into permanent contracts  
 
50 yes 
- Transformation into permanent contracts for 
unemployed women in jobs with a small weight of 
female employment 
 
60 yes 
- Transformation into permanent contracts for 
unemployed workers > 45 years 
 
60 (2 first years)  
 50 (thereafter) 
yes 
- Disabled workers21 - yes 
 31
 
Table B4:  Comparison of laws and groups before the 2001 labour market reform 
 
 
Application period 
16/5/1997 - 
16/5/1999 
17/5/1999 - 
31/12/1999 
1/1/2000 - 
3/3/2001 
Groups Law 64/199722 Law 50/199823 Law 55/199924 
 
- Unemployed workers < 30 years 
 
 
40 
 
35 (first year)  
25 (second year) 
20 
 
- Long-run unemployed workers 40 40 (first year)  
30 (second year) 
50 (first year)  
45 (second year) 
- Long-run unemployed women in jobs 
with a small weight of female 
employment 
 
 
60 45 (first year)  
40 (second year) 
 
60 (first year)  
55 (thereafter) 
 
- Unemployed workers > 45 years 60 (2 first years)  
50 (thereafter) 
45 (first year)  
40 (thereafter) 
50 (first year)  
45 (thereafter) 
- Transformation into permanent 
contracts 
 
50 
25 20 
- Transformation into permanent 
contracts for unemployed women in jobs 
with a small weight of female 
employment 
 
 
60 
 
 
25 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
 
 
- Transformation into permanent 
contracts for unemployed > 45 years 
 
60 (2 first years)  
50 (thereafter) 
25 (2 first years)  
25 (thereafter) 20 
 
- Disabled workers - - - 
 
- Unemployed women in jobs with a 
small weight of female employment > 45 
years 
 
 
- - 
 
60 (first year)  
55 (thereafter) 
 
- Unemployed women in jobs with a 
small weight of female employment 
 
- Unemployed workers in a very difficult 
economic and social situation25 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
35 (first year) 
30 (thereafter) 
 
65 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 All notes of Table B3 are valid for this column, and the limit of 24 months is also valid for every column. 
23 RD 5/1999 introduced modifications to this law, but it did not affect to this table. The permanent contracts 
done to women included in the group of unemployed workers below 30 years, above 45 years, and long-run 
unemployed workers received an increase of the corresponding percentage by five points. Permanent contracts 
and transformations of temporary contracts into permanent ones generated between 17th May 1997 and 17th 
May 1999 could obtain a reduction of 20% for an additional period of 12 months after the first period of 24 
months. 
24 There was not any difference about self-employed workers between Law 64/1997 and Law 50/1998. 
However, Law 55/1999 incorporates new percentages depending on the membership of several groups:  
1. If an unemployed worker above 45 years or a long-run unemployed worker was hired, the percentages 
were 60% for the first year, and 55% for the second year. 
2. For an unemployed worker below 30 years or an unemployed woman in jobs with a small weight of 
female employment not included in the previous point, the percentages were 35% for the first year and 
30% for the second year. 
25 This reduction could be received using also temporary contracts, with a maximum period of 24 months.  
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Table B5: Comparison of laws and groups from the 2001 labour market reform 
 
 
Application period 4/3/2001 - 31/12/2002 1/1/2003 – 31/12/2003 
Groups Law 12/200126 Law 53/2002 
 
- Unemployed women ≤ 45 years 
 
 
25 25 
 
- Medium-run unemployed workers 
 
20 20 
- Unemployed women in jobs with a small 
weight of female employment 
 
 
35 
 
35 
- Unemployed women in jobs with a small 
weight of female employment > 45 years 
 
70 (first year)  
60 (second year) 
 
70 (first year)  
60 (second year) 
 
- Medium-run unemployed women in jobs 
with a small weight of female employment 
 
70 (first year)  
60 (second year) 
 
70 (first year)  
60 (second year) 
 
- Unemployed workers who can receive 
benefits at least for the next year  
 
50 (first year)  
45 (second year) 
 
50 (first year)  
45 (second year) 
 
- Unemployed workers > 45 & < 55 years 50 (first year)  
45 (second year) 
50 (first year)  
45 (second year) 
- Unemployed workers ≥ 55 & < 65 years 55 (first year)  
50 (second year) 
55 (first year)  
50 (second year) 
- Unemployed workers in a very difficult 
economic and social situation27 
 
 
65 
 
65 
- Unemployed workers receiving  insertion 
active income > 45 & < 55 years 
 
 
65 
65 (first 2 years) 
45 (thereafter) 
 
- Unemployed workers receiving  insertion 
active income ≥ 55 & < 65 years 
 
 
65 
65 (first 2 years) 
50 (thereafter) 
 
- Long-run unemployed women who are 
hired before 2 years after the childbirth 
 
 
100 (only 1 year) 
 
 
100 (only 1 year) 
- Unemployed workers included in the 
Agricultural regimen of the Social Security 
 
90 (first year)  
85 (second year) 
 
90 (first year)  
85 (second year) 
 
- Transformation into permanent contracts 
 
25 
 
25 
 
- Disabled workers 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- Unemployed substituting workers with a 
period of maternity or similar situation 100 100 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 For both laws, these percentages were increased five points if a self-employed worker hires any of these 
groups, except for long-run unemployed women who were hired before 2 years after the childbirth. The 
maximum period that these measures could be used is 24 months, unless there was an explicit comment 
indicating other limit. The permanent contracts done to women included in the group of unemployed workers 
above 45 years, long-run unemployed workers, those who could receive benefits at least for the next year, and 
those in a very difficult social and economic situation received an increase of the corresponding percentage by 
ten points. 
27 This reduction could be received using also temporary contracts, with a maximum period of 24 months. 
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Table B6: Comparison of labour market reforms for the new permanent contract 
 
 
Application period 16/5/1997 - 4/3/2001 4/3/2001 - 
Groups Law 63/1997 Law 12/2001 
 
- Unemployed women >16 & < 30 years 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
- Unemployed men >16 & < 30 years 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
- Unemployed women ≥ 30 & ≤ 45 years 
 
No 
 
No 
 
- Unemployed men ≥ 30 & ≤ 45 years 
 
No 
 
No 
 
- Unemployed workers > 45 & < 55 years 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
- Unemployed workers ≥ 55 & < 65 years 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
- Medium-run unemployed workers No 
 
Yes 
 
- Long-run unemployed workers 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
- Unemployed women in jobs with a small weight 
of female employment 
No Yes 
 
 
- Unemployed workers who can receive benefits 
at least for the next year 
 
 
No 
 
 
No 
 
 
- Unemployed workers in a very difficult 
economic and social situation 
 
No 
 
No 
 
- Unemployed workers receiving  insertion active 
income > 45 & < 55 years 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
- Unemployed workers receiving  insertion active 
income ≥ 55 & < 65 years 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
- Long-run unemployed women who are hired in 
the 2 years after the childbirth 
 
 
No 
 
 
No 
 
- Unemployed workers included in the 
Agricultural regimen of the Social Security 
 
 
No 
 
 
No 
 
- Disabled workers Yes 
 
Yes 
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Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics. 
 
 
Table C1: Descriptive statistics for the entire sample 
 
       
  Total  
  <30 30-44 45-54 55-65  
 Age 23.77 35.90 48.83 57.78  
   (3.03) (4.30) (2.83) (2.48)  
 Primary Education  42.19 43.06 36.11 26.00  
 Secondary Education  26.30 18.99 12.32 9.52  
 No idioms 64.51 70.94 85.64 85.73  
 English 32.55 20.52 8.02 8.32  
 Single 98.01 58.66 18.28 16.91  
 Married 1.87 37.37 73.30 74.85  
 Do not receive benefits 74.26 45.36 42.65 30.21  
 Madrid as residence 99.97 99.97 99.98 99.98  
 Active labour demand (months) 2.83 5.25 6.71 7.12  
   (6.62) (12.79) (15.86) (15.42)  
 Restaurant workers, protection and sellers* 24.95 21.42 24.11 26.42  
 White-collar workers* 18.30 18.93 14.66 8.31  
 Non-skilled workers* 20.23 19.74 23.93 17.26  
 Other business activities28 32.69 33.85 33.29 31.86  
 Construction 5.57 8.69 11.95 18.39  
 Hotel and Catering business 8.10 11.27 14.22 12.84  
 No last job 14.59 3.52 3.29 2.60  
 Permanent 14.23 13.76 18.02 20.75  
 Sample 1,069,027 527,517 155,547 45,464  
       
 
 
Table C2: Descriptive statistics for men 
 
       
  Men  
  <30 30-44 45-54 55-65  
 Age 23.43 35.75 49.16 57.89  
   (3.28) (4.26) (2.87) (2.44)  
 Primary Education  45.63 42.16 28.78 22.11  
 Secondary Education  23.06 18.29 15.42 11.73  
 No idioms 69.72 73.21 85.09 86.70  
 English 28.02 20.02 8.64 7.46  
 Single 98.55 63.81 17.36 10.39  
 Married 1.27 33.60 76.94 84.78  
 Do not receive benefits 71.68 38.93 34.54 28.06  
 Madrid as residence 99.88 99.86 99.90 99.93  
 Active labour demand (months) 2.74 4.71 6.83 10.67  
   (5.93) (9.90) (13.79) (19.35)  
 Restaurant workers, protection and sellers* 12.26 13.15 11.39 8.83  
 White-collar workers* 10.84 10.22 8.95 5.87  
 Non-skilled workers* 25.38 14.67 11.51 12.22  
 Other business activities 26.26 25.28 23.22 22.55  
 Construction 11.08 18.63 23.76 27.44  
 Hotel and Catering business 6.79 7.96 7.30 5.19  
 No last job 15.62 3.31 2.63 3.16  
                                                 
28 Other business activities include multiple and different aspects related to Accounting, Law, Consultancy, 
Advertising, recruitment agencies, research and security services among others. 
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 Permanent 20.16 22.94 39.65 42.97  
 Sample 108,997 53,290 20,524 9,526  
 
 
Table C3: Descriptive statistics for women 
       
  Women  
  <30 30-44 45-54 55-65  
 Age 23.67 35.93 48.60 57.48  
   (3.14) (4.26) (2.79) (2.39)  
 Primary Education  34.25 38.31 38.54 31.79  
 Secondary Education  27.74 20.15 13.83 10.80  
 No idioms 55.45 65.68 83.47 84.84  
 English 40.33 24.09 8.73 7.51  
 Single 96.54 48.84 17.19 15.42  
 Married 3.19 45.95 71.43 69.94  
 Do not receive benefits 76.14 53.77 58.82 55.27  
 Madrid as residence 99.92 99.93 99.98 99.98  
 Active labour demand (months) 4.09 9.11 12.12 13.40  
   (8.57) (17.38) (23.00) (24.17)  
 Restaurant workers, protection and sellers* 32.17 21.66 21.96 25.63  
 White-collar workers* 25.88 27.78 22.28 15.83  
 Non-skilled workers* 10.65 20.23 33.23 36.56  
 Other business activities 28.51 34.20 34.73 34.12  
 Construction 1.42 2.03 2.03 2.30  
 Hotel and Catering business 7.54 8.83 10.21 10.50  
 No last job 20.42 6.25 7.47 8.05  
 Permanent 21.90 22.08 31.30 40.65  
 Sample 138,572 75,437 20,414 4,221  
       
* Economic activity selected as first option to get a job. The later three economic activities refer to that associated to the last job. 
The table reports means and percentages for the indicated group. Standard deviations are in parenthesis where appropriate. 
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Appendix D: Results derived from estimation of the models. 
 
 
Table D1: Permanent Employment Probabilities 
 
Education Primary Secondary Graduate Primary Secondary Graduate Primary Secondary Graduate Primary Secondary Graduate
Age < 30 0.0403*** 0.0413*** 0.0499*** 0.0135*** 0.0141*** 0.0167*** - - - - - -
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0027) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0029) - - - - - -
Age є [45,55) 0.0616*** 0.0634*** 0.0772*** - - - 0.0079 0.0085 0.0111 - - -
(0.0042) (0.0043) (0.0049) - - - (0.0050) (0.0054) (0.0071) - - -
Age ≥ 55 0.0386*** 0.0396*** 0.0478*** - - - - - - 0.1011*** 0.1194*** 0.1789***
(0.0047) (0.0048) (0.0057) - - - - - - (0.0097) (0.0118) (0.0179)
(Age < 30)×Reform -0.0238*** -0.0243*** -0.0285*** -0.0112*** -0.0116*** -0.0136*** - - - - - -
(0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0042) (0.0037) (0.0039) (0.0045) - - - - - -
(Age є [45,55))×Reform 0.0066 0.0068 0.0080 - - - 0.0125* 0.0134* 0.0176* - - -
(0.0056) (0.0057) (0.0068) - - - (0.0071) (0.0076) (0.0100) - - -
(Age ≥ 55)×Reform -0.0035 -0.0036 -0.0043 - - - - - - -0.0020 -0.0023 -0.0030
(0.0088) (0.0090) (0.0106) - - - - - - (0.0093) (0.0106) (0.0140)
(Age < 30)×Expansion 0.0210*** 0.0215*** 0.0253*** 0.0348*** 0.0360*** 0.0419*** - - - - - -
(0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0038) - - - - - -
(Age є [45,55))×Expansion 0.0479*** 0.0489*** 0.0569*** - - - 0.0216*** 0.0231*** 0.0296*** - - -
(0.0047) (0.0048) (0.0054) - - - (0.0057) (0.0061) (0.0077) - - -
(Age ≥ 55)×Expansion 0.0017 0.0017 0.0020 - - - - - - 0.0341*** 0.0385*** 0.0497***
(0.0061) (0.0062) (0.0073) - - - - - - (0.0076) (0.0085) (0.0106)
(Age < 30)×Reform×Expansion 0.0161*** 0.0165*** 0.0194*** -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004 - - - - - -
(0.0056) (0.0057) (0.0067) (0.0059) (0.0061) (0.0072) - - - - - -
(Age є [45,55))×Reform×Expansion -0.0319*** -0.0327*** -0.0393*** - - - -0.0260** -0.0280** -0.0371** - - -
(0.0098) (0.0101) (0.0123) - - - (0.0123) (0.0133) (0.0179) - - -
(Age ≥ 55)×Reform×Expansion 0.0018 0.0018 0.0021 - - - - - - -0.0280* -0.0322* -0.0440*
(0.0187) (0.0192) (0.0227) - - - - - - (0.0158) (0.0183) (0.0254)
N 837,489 837,489 837,489 327,533 327,533 327,533 100,498 100,498 100,498 78,064 78,064 78,064
Education Primary Secondary Graduate Primary Secondary Graduate Primary Secondary Graduate Primary Secondary Graduate
Age < 30 0.0518*** 0.0511*** 0.0562*** 0.0107*** 0.0112*** 0.0138*** - - - - - -
(0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0021) - - - - - -
Age є [45,55) 0.1159*** 0.1139*** 0.1279*** - - - 0.0174*** 0.0200*** 0.0240*** - - -
(0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0073) - - - (0.0031) (0.0036) (0.0044) - - -
Age ≥ 55 0.1911*** 0.1872*** 0.2160*** - - - - - - 0.1027*** 0.1138*** 0.1387***
(0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0135) - - - - - - (0.0133) (0.0148) (0.0181)
(Age < 30)×Reform -0.0474*** -0.0469*** -0.0502*** -0.0190*** -0.0197*** -0.0239*** - - - - - -
(0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0050) (0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0037) - - - - - -
(Age є [45,55))×Reform -0.0219** -0.0217** -0.0233** - - - -0.0022 -0.0026 -0.0030 - - -
(0.0085) (0.0084) (0.0091) - - - (0.0050) (0.0057) (0.0067) - - -
(Age ≥ 55)×Reform 0.0152 0.0150 0.0163 - - - - - - 0.0056 0.0061 0.0071
(0.0163) (0.0161) (0.0174) - - - - - - (0.0125) (0.0136) (0.0158)
(Age < 30)×Expansion 0.0479*** 0.0474*** 0.0507*** 0.0218*** 0.0226*** 0.0274*** - - - - - -
(0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0028) - - - - - -
(Age є [45,55))×Expansion 0.0170*** 0.0168*** 0.0181*** - - - 0.0166*** 0.0189*** 0.0223*** - - -
(0.0063) (0.0062) (0.0066) - - - (0.0041) (0.0047) (0.0055) - - -
(Age ≥ 55)×Expansion 0.0203* 0.0201* 0.0216* - - - - - - 0.0363*** 0.0391*** 0.0449***
(0.0121) (0.0119) (0.0128) - - - - - - (0.0105) (0.0112) (0.0127)
(Age < 30)×Reform×Expansion -0.0135* -0.0133* -0.0145* -0.0015 -0.0016 -0.0019 - - - - - -
(0.0074) (0.0073) (0.0080) (0.0042) (0.0044) (0.0054) - - - - - -
(Age є [45,55))×Reform×Expansion 0.0100 0.0099 0.0107 - - - -0.0079 -0.0091 -0.0109 - - -
(0.0174) (0.0172) (0.0186) - - - (0.0090) (0.0103) (0.0124) - - -
(Age ≥ 55)×Reform×Expansion -0.0457 -0.0451 -0.0495 - - - - - - -0.0435** -0.0475** -0.0562*
(0.0336) (0.0331) (0.0367) - - - - - - (0.0220) (0.0242) (0.0289)
N 867851 867851 867851 348,970 348,970 348,970 122,851 122,851 122,851 79,381 79,381 79,381
WOMEN
Full Sample Restricted Age Groups
25-35 40-50 40-44 / 55-60
MEN
Full Sample Restricted Age Groups
25-35 40-50 40-44 / 55-60
 
 
Note: The table presents the probit marginal effects at the mean or the most representative values of the variables where is 
possible and consistent with the rest of variables. The robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. * Significant at 10% 
level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level. 
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Table D2: Transition Probabilities from non-employment to permanent employment 
 
 
Education Primary Secondary Graduate Primary Secondary Graduate Primary Secondary Graduate Primary Secondary Graduate
Age < 30 0.0121*** 0.0135*** 0.0184*** 0.0085*** 0.0094*** 0.0117*** - - - - - -
(0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0027) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0022) - - - - - -
Age є [45,55) 0.0360*** 0.0405*** 0.0565*** - - - 0.0192*** 0.0239*** 0.0366*** - - -
(0.0036) (0.0039) (0.0050) - - - (0.0041) (0.0050) (0.0077) - - -
Age ≥ 55 0.0086*** 0.0096*** 0.0129*** - - - - - - 0.0778*** 0.1125*** 0.2082***
(0.0032) (0.0036) (0.0048) - - - - - - (0.0083) (0.0119) (0.0208)
(Age < 30)×Reform -0.0180*** -0.0200*** -0.0265*** -0.0075*** -0.0083*** -0.0102*** - - - - - -
(0.0029) (0.0033) (0.0043) (0.0027) (0.0030) (0.0037) - - - - - -
(Age є [45,55))×Reform 0.0006 0.0006 0.0008 - - - 0.0014 0.0017 0.0025 - - -
(0.0038) (0.0043) (0.0058) - - - (0.0060) (0.0074) (0.0111) - - -
(Age ≥ 55)×Reform -0.0013 -0.0014 -0.0019 - - - - - - -0.0065 -0.0086 -0.0131
(0.0056) (0.0062) (0.0083) - - - - - - (0.0087) (0.0116) (0.0176)
(Age < 30)×Expansion 0.0090*** 0.0100*** 0.0133*** 0.0169*** 0.0187*** 0.0228*** - - - - - -
(0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0031) (0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0032) - - - - - -
(Age є [45,55))×Expansion 0.0209*** 0.0231*** 0.0306*** - - - 0.0092* 0.0113** 0.0166** - - -
(0.0034) (0.0038) (0.0048) - - - (0.0047) (0.0057) (0.0083) - - -
(Age ≥ 55)×Expansion 0.0013 0.0014 0.0019 - - - - - - 0.0212*** 0.0279*** 0.0416***
(0.0039) (0.0043) (0.0058) - - - - - - (0.0072) (0.0093) (0.0134)
(Age < 30)×Reform×Expansion 0.0140*** 0.0155*** 0.0207*** 0.0040 0.0044 0.0054 - - - - - -
(0.0047) (0.0053) (0.0069) (0.0044) (0.0049) (0.0060) - - - - - -
(Age є [45,55))×Reform×Expansion -0.0192*** -0.0215*** -0.0294*** - - - -0.0203** -0.0252** -0.0387** - - -
(0.0060) (0.0067) (0.0093) - - - (0.0093) (0.0116) (0.0181) - - -
(Age ≥ 55)×Reform×Expansion -0.0066 -0.0074 -0.0100 - - - - - - -0.0356*** -0.0489*** -0.0803***
(0.0113) (0.0126) (0.0172) - - - - - - (0.0119) (0.0166) (0.0284)
N 763884 763884 763884 295,201 295,201 295,201 91,671 91,671 91,671 72,056 72,056 72,056
Education Primary Secondary Graduate Primary Secondary Graduate Primary Secondary Graduate Primary Secondary Graduate
Age < 30 0.0171*** 0.0173*** 0.0211*** 0.0060*** 0.0067*** 0.0085*** - - - - - -
(0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0039) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0015) - - - - - -
Age є [45,55) 0.0688*** 0.0697*** 0.0872*** - - - 0.0126*** 0.0161*** 0.0222*** - - -
(0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0095) - - - (0.0023) (0.0029) (0.0042) - - -
Age ≥ 55 0.0987*** 0.1001*** 0.1276*** - - - - - - 0.0700*** 0.0813*** 0.1232***
(0.0129) (0.0130) (0.0150) - - - - - - (0.0104) (0.0123) (0.0184)
(Age < 30)×Reform -0.0348*** -0.0352*** -0.0419*** -0.0093*** -0.0102*** -0.0129*** - - - - - -
(0.0051) (0.0052) (0.0060) (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0029) - - - - - -
(Age є [45,55))×Reform -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0010 - - - 0.0018 0.0023 0.0031 - - -
(0.0072) (0.0073) (0.0088) - - - (0.0036) (0.0045) (0.0061) - - -
(Age ≥ 55)×Reform 0.0069 0.0069 0.0084 - - - - - - 0.0028 0.0031 0.0044
(0.0125) (0.0126) (0.0152) - - - - - - (0.0109) (0.0124) (0.0172)
(Age < 30)×Expansion 0.0193*** 0.0195*** 0.0234*** 0.0091*** 0.0100*** 0.0127*** - - - - - -
(0.0037) (0.0038) (0.0043) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0021) - - - - - -
(Age є [45,55))×Expansion 0.0116** 0.0118** 0.0141** - - - 0.0024 0.0030 0.0041 - - -
(0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0065) - - - (0.0027) (0.0033) (0.0045) - - -
(Age ≥ 55)×Expansion 0.0008 0.0008 0.0009 - - - - - - 0.0068 0.0076 0.0106
(0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0108) - - - - - - (0.0080) (0.0091) (0.0124)
(Age < 30)×Reform×Expansion 0.0111 0.0112 0.0135 0.0020 0.0022 0.0028 - - - - - -
(0.0076) (0.0077) (0.0092) (0.0030) (0.0033) (0.0041) - - - - - -
(Age є [45,55))×Reform×Expansion -0.0173 -0.0175 -0.0213 - - - -0.0024 -0.0030 -0.0041 - - -
(0.0135) (0.0136) (0.0166) - - - (0.0065) (0.0082) (0.0112) - - -
(Age ≥ 55)×Reform×Expansion -0.0168 -0.0170 -0.0207 - - - - - - -0.0186 -0.0211 -0.0298
(0.0247) (0.0250) (0.0305) - - - - - - (0.0186) (0.0212) (0.0304)
N 802587 802587 802587 318,834 318,834 318,834 115,144 115,144 115,144 75,137 75,137 75,137
WOMEN
Full Sample Restricted Age Groups
25-35 40-50 40-44 / 55-60
MEN
Full Sample Restricted Age Groups
25-35 40-50 40-44 / 55-60
 
 
Note: The table presents the probit marginal effects at the mean or the most representative values of the variables where is 
possible and consistent with the rest of variables. The robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. * Significant at 10% 
level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level. 
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Table D3: Transition Probabilities from temporary to permanent employment (conversions) 
 
 
Education Primary Secondary Graduate Primary Secondary Graduate Primary Secondary Graduate Primary Secondary Graduate
Age < 30 0.0020** 0.0019** 0.0028** 0.0006 0.0006 0.0008 - - - - - -
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0018) - - - - - -
Age є [45,55) -0.0046** -0.0044** -0.0063** - - - -0.0047** -0.0047** -0.0075** - - -
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0029) - - - (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0032) - - -
Age ≥ 55 0.0194*** 0.0186*** 0.0275*** - - - - - - -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0019
(0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0048) - - - - - - (0.0040) (0.0042) (0.0076)
(Age < 30)×Reform 0.0008 0.0008 0.0012 0.0018 0.0019 0.0026 - - - - - -
(0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0021) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0024) - - - - - -
(Age є [45,55))×Reform 0.0006 0.0006 0.0008 - - - 0.0008 0.0008 0.0013 - - -
(0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0048) - - - (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0037) - - -
(Age ≥ 55)×Reform -0.0044 -0.0043 -0.0061 - - - - - - -0.0028 -0.0029 -0.0053
(0.0064) (0.0062) (0.0089) - - - - - - (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0047)
(Age < 30)×Expansion -0.0076*** -0.0073*** -0.0106*** -0.0036** -0.0036** -0.0050** - - - - - -
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0022) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0024) - - - - - -
(Age є [45,55))×Expansion 0.0153*** 0.0148*** 0.0208*** - - - 0.0039 0.0039 0.0062 - - -
(0.0047) (0.0046) (0.0062) - - - (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0043) - - -
(Age ≥ 55)×Expansion 0.0065 0.0063 0.0089 - - - - - - 0.0072** 0.0076** 0.0135**
(0.0066) (0.0063) (0.0089) - - - - - - (0.0034) (0.0036) (0.0063)
(Age < 30)×Reform×Expansion 0.0012 0.0012 0.0017 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 - - - - - -
(0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0038) (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0047) - - - - - -
(Age є [45,55))×Reform×Expansion -0.0243*** -0.0233*** -0.0347*** - - - -0.0090*** -0.0091*** -0.0151** - - -
(0.0054) (0.0052) (0.0077) - - - (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0060) - - -
(Age ≥ 55)×Reform×Expansion -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0008 - - - - - - -0.0078** -0.0082** -0.0158**
(0.0171) (0.0164) (0.0236) - - - - - - (0.0033) (0.0035) (0.0070)
N 763,045 763,045 763,045 298,419 298,419 298,419 88,805 88,805 88,805 69,958 69,958 69,958
Education Primary Secondary Graduate Primary Secondary Graduate Primary Secondary Graduate Primary Secondary Graduate
Age < 30 0.0160*** 0.0151*** 0.0194*** 0.0024* 0.0023* 0.0032* - - - - - -
(0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0031) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0016) - - - - - -
Age є [45,55) 0.0167*** 0.0158*** 0.0202*** - - - 0.0008 0.0009 0.0011 - - -
(0.0053) (0.0051) (0.0063) - - - (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0021) - - -
Age ≥ 55 0.0708*** 0.0666*** 0.0886*** - - - - - - 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0127) (0.0122) (0.0148) - - - - - - (0.0072) (0.0083) (0.0084)
(Age < 30)×Reform -0.0062* -0.0059* -0.0074* -0.0030* -0.0029* -0.0040* - - - - - -
(0.0033) (0.0031) (0.0039) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0024) - - - - - -
(Age є [45,55))×Reform -0.0018 -0.0017 -0.0022 - - - -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004 - - -
(0.0077) (0.0073) (0.0093) - - - (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0029) - - -
(Age ≥ 55)×Reform 0.0271* 0.0256* 0.0330* - - - - - - 0.0024 0.0028 0.0029
(0.0156) (0.0148) (0.0189) - - - - - - (0.0040) (0.0046) (0.0047)
(Age < 30)×Expansion -0.0123*** -0.0116*** -0.0149*** -0.0071*** -0.0071*** -0.0098*** - - - - - -
(0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0041) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0020) - - - - - -
(Age є [45,55))×Expansion 0.0050 0.0047 0.0060 - - - 0.0035 0.0040 0.0046 - - -
(0.0089) (0.0084) (0.0107) - - - (0.0028) (0.0032) (0.0037) - - -
(Age ≥ 55)×Expansion 0.0035 0.0033 0.0042 - - - - - - -0.0020 -0.0023 -0.0023
(0.0209) (0.0198) (0.0251) - - - - - - (0.0048) (0.0056) (0.0057)
(Age < 30)×Reform×Expansion -0.0236*** -0.0223*** -0.0287*** -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0021 - - - - - -
(0.0060) (0.0057) (0.0071) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0043) - - - - - -
(Age є [45,55))×Reform×Expansion -0.0471*** -0.0444*** -0.0582*** - - - -0.0091*** -0.0107** -0.0125** - - -
(0.0161) (0.0152) (0.0198) - - - (0.0035) (0.0042) (0.0050) - - -
(Age ≥ 55)×Reform×Expansion -0.1054*** -0.0983*** -0.1355*** - - - - - - -0.0166*** -0.0196*** -0.0199***
(0.0235) (0.0220) (0.0304) - - - - - - (0.0050) (0.0059) (0.0065)
N 810,811 810,811 810,811 324,818 324,818 324,818 114,157 114,157 114,157 75,211 75,211 75,211
WOMEN
Full Sample Restricted Age Groups
25-35 40-50 40-44 / 55-60
MEN
Full Sample Restricted Age Groups
25-35 40-50 40-44 / 55-60
 
 
Note: The table presents the probit marginal effects at the mean or the most representative values of the variables where is 
possible and consistent with the rest of variables. The robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. * Significant at 10% 
level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level. 
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Table D4: Transition Probabilities from temporary to permanent employment (not 
conversions) 
 
 
Education Primary Secondary Graduate Primary Secondary Graduate Primary Secondary Graduate Primary Secondary Graduate
Age < 30 0.0289*** 0.0292*** 0.0357*** 0.0086*** 0.0090*** 0.0107*** - - - - - -
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0027) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0021) - - - - - -
Age є [45,55) 0.0461*** 0.0468*** 0.0577*** - - - 0.0061 0.0063 0.0082 - - -
(0.0044) (0.0045) (0.0053) - - - (0.0040) (0.0042) (0.0055) - - -
Age ≥ 55 0.0139*** 0.0141*** 0.0171*** - - - - - - 0.0620*** 0.0710*** 0.1087***
(0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0050) - - - - - - (0.0075) (0.0090) (0.0143)
(Age < 30)×Reform -0.0202*** -0.0204*** -0.0244*** -0.0085*** -0.0088*** -0.0104*** - - - - - -
(0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0040) (0.0029) (0.0031) (0.0036) - - - - - -
(Age є [45,55))×Reform -0.0054 -0.0055 -0.0066 - - - 0.0022 0.0023 0.0030 - - -
(0.0050) (0.0051) (0.0061) - - - (0.0058) (0.0060) (0.0078) - - -
(Age ≥ 55)×Reform -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0017 - - - - - - -0.0088 -0.0099 -0.0138
(0.0075) (0.0076) (0.0092) - - - - - - (0.0080) (0.0090) (0.0125)
(Age < 30)×Expansion 0.0239*** 0.0242*** 0.0288*** 0.0228*** 0.0236*** 0.0278*** - - - - - -
(0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0032) (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0031) - - - - - -
(Age є [45,55))×Expansion -0.0066** -0.0067** -0.0080** - - - -0.0084** -0.0087** -0.0114** - - -
(0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0039) - - - (0.0037) (0.0039) (0.0051) - - -
(Age ≥ 55)×Expansion -0.0044 -0.0044 -0.0053 - - - - - - -0.0183*** -0.0206*** -0.0297***
(0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0062) - - - - - - (0.0047) (0.0053) (0.0078)
(Age < 30)×Reform×Expansion 0.0239*** 0.0242*** 0.0288*** 0.0137*** 0.0142*** 0.0168*** - - - - - -
(0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0062) (0.0049) (0.0051) (0.0060) - - - - - -
(Age є [45,55))×Reform×Expansion 0.0263** 0.0266** 0.0317** - - - 0.0039 0.0041 0.0053 - - -
(0.0109) (0.0110) (0.0129) - - - (0.0112) (0.0115) (0.0150) - - -
(Age ≥ 55)×Reform×Expansion 0.0078 0.0079 0.0095 - - - - - - 0.0228 0.0254 0.0351
(0.0163) (0.0165) (0.0198) - - - - - - (0.0165) (0.0183) (0.0249)
N 773,344 773,344 773,344 299,759 299,759 299,759 91,672 91,672 91,672 71,236 71,236 71,236
Education Primary Secondary Graduate Primary Secondary Graduate Primary Secondary Graduate Primary Secondary Graduate
Age < 30 0.0287*** 0.0277*** 0.0326*** 0.0028*** 0.0029*** 0.0035*** - - - - - -
(0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0037) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0011) - - - - - -
Age є [45,55) 0.0687*** 0.0661*** 0.0792*** - - - 0.0098*** 0.0113*** 0.0130*** - - -
(0.0092) (0.0090) (0.0099) - - - (0.0024) (0.0028) (0.0033) - - -
Age ≥ 55 0.0786*** 0.0755*** 0.0910*** - - - - - - 0.0534*** 0.0634*** 0.0747***
(0.0119) (0.0116) (0.0131) - - - - - - (0.0085) (0.0103) (0.0131)
(Age < 30)×Reform -0.0382*** -0.0370*** -0.0427*** -0.0095*** -0.0099*** -0.0118*** - - - - - -
(0.0051) (0.0050) (0.0056) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0023) - - - - - -
(Age є [45,55))×Reform -0.0173** -0.0167** -0.0194** - - - -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003 - - -
(0.0069) (0.0067) (0.0077) - - - (0.0040) (0.0045) (0.0052) - - -
(Age ≥ 55)×Reform 0.0094 0.0091 0.0106 - - - - - - 0.0068 0.0079 0.0090
(0.0129) (0.0125) (0.0146) - - - - - - (0.0087) (0.0101) (0.0115)
(Age < 30)×Expansion 0.0521*** 0.0506*** 0.0581*** 0.0109*** 0.0113*** 0.0135*** - - - - - -
(0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0057) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0017) - - - - - -
(Age є [45,55))×Expansion -0.0424*** -0.0408*** -0.0484*** - - - -0.0053** -0.0060** -0.0069** - - -
(0.0058) (0.0056) (0.0063) - - - (0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0033) - - -
(Age ≥ 55)×Expansion -0.0492*** -0.0474*** -0.0563*** - - - - - - -0.0172*** -0.0200*** -0.0231***
(0.0087) (0.0085) (0.0098) - - - - - - (0.0055) (0.0065) (0.0076)
(Age < 30)×Reform×Expansion 0.0198*** 0.0191*** 0.0222*** 0.0086*** 0.0089*** 0.0107*** - - - - - -
(0.0070) (0.0068) (0.0077) (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0035) - - - - - -
(Age є [45,55))×Reform×Expansion 0.1053*** 0.1025*** 0.1160*** - - - 0.0076 0.0086 0.0098 - - -
(0.0196) (0.0193) (0.0209) - - - (0.0083) (0.0094) (0.0107) - - -
(Age ≥ 55)×Reform×Expansion 0.0670* 0.0651* 0.0744* - - - - - - 0.0112 0.0129 0.0147
(0.0364) (0.0355) (0.0399) - - - - - - (0.0210) (0.0240) (0.0273)
N 810,157 810,157 810,157 322,096 322,096 322,096 115,594 115,594 115,594 74,923 74,923 74,923
WOMEN
Full Sample Restricted Age Groups
25-35 40-50 40-44 / 55-60
MEN
Full Sample Restricted Age Groups
25-35 40-50 40-44 / 55-60
 
 
Note: The table presents the probit marginal effects at the mean or the most representative values of the variables where is 
possible and consistent with the rest of variables. The robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. * Significant at 10% 
level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level. 
 
 
 
